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Self, Otherness, Theology, and 
Ontology: A Critical  
Engagement between Tillich and 




Paul Tillich would no doubt be fascinated with 
postmodern thinkers, whom—to a considerable ex-
tent—he had anticipated in his critical appreciation 
of Nietzsche, Expressionism, depth psychology, and 
the “death of God” theologians. My purpose here is 
to analyze Tillich’s conceptions of self with respect 
to postmodern thinkers who characterize the self as 
the displaced self, anti-cogito, or the self as consti-
tuted by otherness. Postmodern thinkers summarily 
assert that the self is to be conceptualized in rela-
tional terms vis-à-vis the alterity of the other, who is 
trace, infinity, or lordship (Emmanuel Levinas), ab-
ject (Julia Kristeva), or ecstatic rupture (Georges 
Bataille). These perspectives interrogate Tillich’s 
theology as to its capacity to accommodate notions 
of otherness. They deconstruct concepts and images 
that totalize (e.g., being), privilege the unity of the 
self, or reduce otherness to sameness. They therefore 
present a formidable challenge to Tillich’s system, 
including, for example, his notions of self-
centeredness, self-transcendence, and the basic onto-
logical structure of self and world. My essay, how-
ever, attempts to render this tension productive by 
highlighting the fruits for both interlocutors.  
My thesis is three-fold. First, I affirm sustain-
ability of Tillich’s project by probing the relation-
ship between self, other, ontology, and theology 
through the mediation of Oliver Davies’s recent 
work. Second, I argue that critical engagement be-
tween Tillich and Kristeva, Levinas, and Bataille 
exposes the limits of Tillich’s notions of otherness, 
particularly with respect to alterity, transcendence, 
and embodiment. Third, I contend that Tillich’s con-
cepts of symbol and love as reunion preserve par-
ticipation and selfhood and problematize notions of 
meaninglessness and subjugation of self to other in 
Kristeva, Levinas, and Bataille. 
 
The Sustainability of Tillich’s Ontology in the 
Contemporary Contexts 
Is Tillich’s ontology still tenable within the anti-
metaphysical milieu of postmodernity? To ascertain 
the answer we will consider the recent work of 
Oliver Davies. In A Theology of Compassion: Meta-
physics of Difference and the Renewal of Tradition, 
Davies reconceptualizes the language of being to 
construct a kenotic Christian ontology of difference. 
Appealing to Levinas and Ricoeur to address rela-
tionality in the post-Holocaust context of annihila-
tion, Davies reinterprets being as “the medium of 
relation between self and other”1 and ontology as a 
narrativity of being disclosed through language-
based exchanges.2 Davies problematizes conceptions 
within traditional metaphysics that emphasize being 
as a unity3 because they perpetuate essentialism and 
exclude and vitiate the concrete other. Yet, given the 
postmodern emphasis on fragmentation and attenua-
tion of the self, Davies affirms the necessity of re-
trieving the language of being: “[T]he language of 
being offers an important resource for articulating 
and drawing forth the intrinsic unity of the self 
which, albeit deferred, is the ground for the knowl-
edge of the world as such.”4 He therefore develops a 
theology of compassion that construes ontology as 
relationality committed to “the absolute primacy of 
the ethical relation with respect to the concrete 
other.”5  
Davies posits that the self’s affirmation of other-
ness concomitantly enriches or deepens the self’s 
existence, that is, the self’s being. Compassion com-
pels kenosis, “a riskful giving and an opening of the 
self before existence,”6 that interconnects existence 
and ontology because “heightened existence repre-
sents a higher degree of ontological density.”7 
Moreover, Davies envisages that self-displacement 
of compassion “sets up a flow of enriched existence 
which draws others towards those who in this way, 
as if by the attraction of being itself”8 and reinscribes 
self and other in terms of being and existence. 
Davies, however, notes that the ontologies of 
Tillich, Bultmann, and Rahner “seem out of place in 
the vigorously language-centred and deconstructive 
landscapes of the present day.”9 There are no addi-
tional references to Tillich’s ontology, but evalua-
tion of the criticisms with respect to Rahner can be 
illuminating for study of Tillich. Davies writes: “We 
differ from Rahner then to the extent that knowledge 
of the other is determined by…the ethical particular-
ity of the relation of the self to the other, and that 
transcendence is a possibility which awakens from 
within that relation and not from an a priori ground 
of all knowing which encompasses it.”10 I contend 
that this worry about an a priori ground negating 
relationality and difference appears misplaced. 
Among possible Tillichian rejoinders,11 Tillich’s in-
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heritance of various aspects of Schelling’s philoso-
phy disavows essentialism and accounts for other-
ness. Tillich affirms the interconnections between 
essence and existence: “[Schelling] did not, how-
ever, abolish what Hegel and he had done before. He 
preserved a philosophy of essence. Against this he 
put the philosophy of existence. Existentialism is not 
a philosophy which can stand on its own legs. Actu-
ally it has no legs. It is always based on a vision of 
the essential structure of reality.”12 This attempted 
fusion of existence and the essential structure of re-
ality frames Tillich’s correlative method and his 
conceptions of self and reality (e.g., the tension be-
tween life and system and being and non-being).  
Schelling attempts to reintegrate essence and ex-
istence because he integrates the “negative philoso-
phy” of the a priori system of absolute Essence and 
the “positive philosophy” of absolute Existent. 
Schelling’s thought bears the influence of Jacob 
Boehme, whom Schelling first encountered in the 
work of Franz von Baader. This influence compels 
Schelling to posit that God assumes Being through a 
dialectic of Yes and No; in similar manner, humans 
experience freedom as spirit, but through contradic-
tion.13 Drawing upon Boehme’s notion of abyss in 
God, Schelling in Ages of the World states: “Because 
the Godhead, in itself neither having being nor not 
having being, is, with respect to external Being, nec-
essarily a consuming No, it must therefore 
also…necessarily be an eternal Yes, reinforcing 
Love, the essence of all essences.”14  
Tillich traces shifts within Schelling’s corpus, 
notably Schelling’s transformation from his early 
philosophy of identity between nature and spirit (ar-
ticulated as a philosophy of nature in his 1800 The 
System of Transcendental Idealism) to his examina-
tion of the self-contradiction of the will and the 
problem of evil (expressed in his 1809 On the Na-
ture of Human) to his later exploration of the dy-
namic of the finite and the infinite and the affirma-
tion of existence in positive philosophy (discussed in 
his 1811-1815 The Ages of the World and the most 
influential on Tillich). The later Schelling’s concept 
of potency of being is particularly fecund for Til-
lich’s understanding of ontology, self, and other-
ness.15 From his reading of Schelling, Tillich places 
emphasis on the divine process of dialectical Yes 
and No that undergirds God’s existence as a personal 
being: “Now, however, Schelling asserted: God ex-
ists. He has separated himself from his ground and 
has won existence [for himself] as living personality, 
by letting his ground hold sway over itself and by 
struggling against it.”16 Tillich asserts that without 
the otherness within God, there would no being, no 
life, and no personal God.17 To be sure, there are dif-
ferences between Tillich and Schelling,18 but it is 
apparent that Schelling significantly informs Til-
lich’s understanding of the relationship between self, 
otherness, and reality. Tillich’s nuanced understand-
ing, in my judgment, gainsays Davies’s criticisms 
and attests to the viability of Tillich’s writings in a 
postmodern context.  
 
Postmodernity, Otherness, and Ontology: 
Bataille on Ecstasy and Nonknowledge 
Bataille, Kristeva, and Levinas in disparate ways 
address suffering, exploitation, and annihilation in 
the world;19 each is concerned with the relationship 
between self and other in terms of communication—
but not communication couched in terms of rational 
discourse or systematic project. Bataille asks: How 
can one communicate to the other the excess of de-
sire and experience without explaining away the pro-
fundity of this experience or this other? Through 
Nietzschean inspired fragments, Bataille insists that 
one must disentangle knowledge, communication, 
and self: “If we didn’t know how to dramatize, we 
wouldn’t be able to leave ourselves...But a sort of 
rupture—in anguish—leaves us at the limit of tears: 
in such a case we lose ourselves, we forget ourselves 
and communicate with an elusive beyond.”20 This 
anguished rupture functions to undercut the totality 
of knowledge or the “satisfaction”21 of the “prison”22 
of the Hegelian project, Bataille’s primary target.23 
Rupture unfolds ecstasy, which Bataille understands 
to be a “contestation of knowledge”24 or “the defeat 
of thought”25 that discloses excess without annihilat-
ing otherness and demands supplication of the self in 
the “horror of surrender.”26 This horror of surrender 
entails anguish and despair, yet it is manifested as 
rapture and joy. Shorn of the limits of discursive 
experience that enclose the self and sublimate other-
ness, ecstasy engenders an “inner presence which we 
cannot apprehend without a startled jump of our en-
tire being, detesting the servility of discourse.”27 In 
the realm of inner presence, ecstasy, sacrifice, eroti-
cism, laughter, and the sacred converge in a tran-
scendence that eviscerates project and creates a 
situation “whereby life situates itself in proportion to 
the impossible.”28  
A conspicuous example of ecstatic attempts to 
surmount the “servility of discourse” occurs in 
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Bataille’s contemplating the image of a decapitated 
Chinese man. Subjected to gruesome torture or, as 
Bataille puts it, laceration, the afflicted man para-
doxically appears to Bataille to be in a sublime state 
of joy. Despite ethical questions regarding instru-
mentality raised by interpreters such as Amy Holly-
wood,29 contemplating the victim induces rupture in 
Bataille: “I loved him with a love in which the sadis-
tic instinct played no part: he communicated his pain 
to me or perhaps the excessive nature of his pain, 
and it was precisely that which I was seeking, not so 
as to take pleasure in it, but in order to ruin in me 
that which is opposed to ruin.”30 No narrative can 
explain this relationality, for that would be tanta-
mount to Hegelian satisfaction, not transcendent ec-
stasy. This ecstatic experience constitutes a sacrifice 
that is effusive in that “it destroys the depths of the 
heart, the depths of being, by unveiling them.”31 
Though Bataille abrogates the soteriological32 un-
derpinnings of the Passion, the cross communicates 
intense pain that disabuses self-interested project. 
 
Tillich’s Response to Bataille: Ecstasy and Ra-
tional Structure 
Is Tillich’s work tantamount to “project”? To 
address Bataille’s criticisms, let us consider Tillich’s 
employment of the term ecstasy. Tillich conceives of 
ecstasy in terms of a self-transcendence experienced 
in and through rational knowledge; unlike Bataille, 
Tillich does not perceive an incompatibility between 
ecstasy, knowledge (reason), self, and other. Til-
lich’s basic ontological structure of self and world 
does not preclude notions of otherness or ecstasy; a 
fortiori, ecstasy is necessitated by the otherness of 
non-being that threatens self and world. Tillich de-
scribes the tumultuous, but intimate relationship be-
tween reason, ecstasy, and the encounter with non-
being:  
The threat of nonbeing, grasping the mind, pro-
duces the ‘ontological shock’ in which the nega-
tive side of the mystery of being—its abysmal 
element is experienced. ‘Shock’ points to a state 
of mind in which the mind is thrown out of its 
normal balance, shaken in its structure. Reason 
reaches it boundary line, is thrown back upon it-
self, and then is driven again to its extreme 
situation.33  
Tillich, therefore, concurs with Bataille’s vision 
of the traumatic effects of ecstasy, but he does not 
equate this disorientation with Bataille’s non-
knowledge. Appropriated from Scriptural and Neo-
platonic, sources,34 ecstasy according to Tillich “is 
the classical term for this state of being grasped by 
the Spiritual Presence” that “drives the spirit of man 
beyond itself without destroying its essential, i.e., 
rational, structure.”35 In contrast to the destruction of 
the demonic, ecstatic reconfiguration is creative be-
cause it promotes self-transcendence, yet it preserves 
participation within the ground of being. This tran-
scendence/ participation dialectic occurs in and 
through the theonomous interpenetration of reason, 
ecstasy, and revelation, for “[e]cstasy occurs only if 
the mind is grasped by the mystery, namely, by the 
ground of being and meaning. And, conversely, 
there is no revelation without ecstasy.”36 Ecstasy, 
reason, and revelation converge in ultimate concern, 
where ecstasy is not reduced to project but is self-
transcending reason that assumes disparate forms, 
including prophetic witness, agapic love, and 
prayer..37 
 
Julia Kristeva on Alterity and Embodiment 
Influenced by Freud and Lacan, Julia Kristeva’s 
work intersects semiotics, psychoanalysis, and femi-
nism. She shares Bataille’s disquiet towards the he-
gemony of the Hegelian project in the Western 
mindset. Kristeva characterizes otherness as the ab-
ject or the discarded that destabilizes self and soci-
ety. In Powers of Horror, Kristeva construes abject 
as “the jettisoned object [that] is radically excluded 
and draws me toward the place where meaning col-
lapses.”38 Similar to Bataille’s notion of ecstasy as 
communicating non-knowledge and, as we will see 
below, Levinas’s repudiation of totality, Kristeva’s 
abject resists reduction to preconceived meanings. 
Abject precludes simple elision between self and 
other, “[f]or the space that engrosses the deject, the 
excluded is never one, nor homogeneous, nor to-
talizable, but essentially divisible, foldable, and 
catastrophic.”39 Moreover, just as Bataille inter-
weaves anguish and rapture, Kristeva associates an-
nihilation of the self and jouissance or radical joy.  
Kristeva extends her analysis further by juxta-
posing the abject and the maternal body. The mater-
nal body, particularly with its the liminal boundaries 
constituted by the fusion of fluids, dependencies, 
and identities, has been muted in Western thought 
such that a woman “will not be able to accede to the 
complexity of being divided, of heterogeneity, of the 
catastrophic-fold-of-‘being.’”40 Additionally noted 
by Levinas,41 the maternal body’s unrepresentable 
abject stands in opposition to the complicity of the 
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linguistically and socially constructed narcissism. In 
Tales of Love, Kristeva contends that the image of 
the Virgin cannot express the otherness of mother-
hood because it signifies “the woman whose entire 
body is an emptiness through which the paternal 
word is conveyed…[and thereby] had remarkably 
subsumed the maternal ‘abject.’”42 
 
Tillich’s Response to Kristeva: Body as a Dimen-
sion of the Person 
Tillich’s treatment of the body is admittedly lim-
ited, though his attention to the ontological structure 
of self and world does not obviate considerations of 
the body. In Dynamics of Faith, Tillich develops his 
concept of self-centeredness, where “body, soul, and 
spirit are not three parts of man. They are dimen-
sions of man’s being, always within each other.”43 
Centeredness of the self enables Tillich to account 
for these distinct, but interrelated spheres of human 
existence. Perhaps Tillich’s most sensitive treatment 
of embodiment, assessed by interpreters such as 
Mary Ann Stenger,44 is illustrated in his critique of 
the father-image of God within Protestant theology. 
Tillich suggests that “[t]he attempt to show that 
nothing can be said about God theologically before 
the statement is made that he is the power of being 
in all being is, at the same time, a way of reducing 
the predominance of the male element in the sym-
bolization of the divine.”45 Kristeva concurs with 
Tillich’s hermeneutics of suspicion vis-à-vis gen-
dered theological construction, but she would prob-
lematize Tillich’s perduring image of self-
integration. According to Tillich, self-integration 
coalesces body and mind, “for only then is mutual 
strangeness and interference excluded.”46 Kristeva’s 
concern for the ineluctable “heterogeneity” of the 
body therefore appears underappreciated by Tillich 
even if he is acutely aware of estrangement.47  
 
Levinas: Totality, Communication, and  
Otherness 
Writing in a post-Holocaust context, Emmanuel 
Levinas censures the totalizing tendencies of West-
ern thought from Parmenides to Hegel to Husserl to 
Heidegger. These various models cannot appreciate 
otherness: “Western philosophy has most often been 
an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by 
interposition of a middle term that ensures the com-
prehension of being.”48 Levinas argues that his phi-
losophical mentors subsume otherness into rubrics 
of intelligibility (Husserl’s transcendent reductions 
and the search for absolute foundations) and homo-
geneity (Heidegger’s preoccupation with Dasein49). 
Levinas intends to debunk the Western project of 
ontology and its proclivity toward totality. Conse-
quently, he embraces the hyperbolic, the superlative, 
the exteriority, and that “which is not a mode of be-
ing showing itself in a theme.”50 
Ontology reflects the domestication and reduc-
tion of otherness; it is encapsulated in what Levinas 
denominates as the said, “the birthplace of ontol-
ogy.”51 Levinas affirms communication between self 
and other, but communication as the saying whose 
“articulation and signifyingness [are] antecedent to 
ontology.”52 Levinas upholds saying because it does 
not efface the other, it does not imprison the infinity 
and trace of the other, and it functions as “expo-
sure”53 and not (Hegelian) “recognition”54 in that it 
induces the self to denude, strip itself, and submit to 
otherness. Levinas insists that to be truly for-the-
other one must experience an intersubjective en-
counter with otherness that puts one’s entire being 
into question. Levinas holds that ethics is metaphys-
ics, not ontology, because metaphysics invites de-
sire, infinity (e.g., the Good beyond Being in Plato 
and Plotinus because “[t]he Good is before being”55), 
fracture (because “the breakup of essence is ethics”56 
manifested in the “[r]upture of being qua being”57), 
and otherness that precede the thematizing and total-
izing character of ontology. This otherness imposes 
“unlimited responsibility”58 that denies individual 
freedom: “It is because there is a vigilance before 
the awakening that the cogito is possible, so that eth-
ics is before ontology. Behind the arrival of the hu-
man there is already the vigilance for the other. The 
transcendental I in its nakedness comes from the 
awakening by and for the other.”59  
This primordial “awakening” challenges Til-
lich’s ontological structure of self and world. Levi-
nas contends that otherness annuls this structure:  
To transcend oneself, to leave one’s home to the 
point of leaving oneself, is to substitute oneself 
for another. It is, in my bearing of myself, not to 
conduct myself well, but by my unicity as a 
unique being to expiate for the other. The open-
ness of space as an openness of self without a 
world, without a place, utopia, the not being 
walled in, inspiration to the end, even to expira-
tion, is proximity of the other which is possible 
only as responsibility for the other, as substitu-
tion for him…[I]t is because newness comes 
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from the other that there is in newness transcen-
dence and signification.60  
Responsibility for the other, not the essential 
character of the self, radically shapes the formation 
of the self’s conscience. Levinas asks: “Is not the 
face of one’s fellow man the original locus in which 
transcendence calls an authority with a silent voice 
in which God comes to mind? Original locus of the 
Infinite?”61 
 
Tillich’s Response to Levinas 
In contrast to Levinas’s notion of the silent voice 
induced by the face of the other, Tillich contends 
that the silent voice of the moral imperative, the con-
frontation with one’s essential being, becomes actu-
alized in and through one’s own conscience. Tillich 
conceives of conscience as a fundamental mecha-
nism for overcoming the problem of the dividedness 
of the self. Though Luther’s view of conscience as 
an inner voice informs Tillich’s understanding of 
conscience, Heidegger’s appeal to silence also has 
significant import for Tillich’s view. Heidegger de-
scribes the call of conscience as declaring a silent 
nothing: “In the appeal Dasein gives itself to under-
stand its own potentiality-for-being. This calling is 
therefore a keeping-silent…Only in keeping silent 
does the conscience call.”62 Though Tillich appropri-
ates Heidegger’s image of conscience as the silent 
voice,63 he does amend Heidegger’s conception. Til-
lich submits that “the self to which the conscience 
calls is the essential, not as Heidegger believes, the 
existential self. It calls us to what we essentially are, 
but it does not tell with certainty what that is.”64 
It is critical, however, to note that Tillich does 
not disengage this silent call of the essential from 
relationality. For example, in a 1943 radio address, 
Tillich impels his German listeners not merely to 
confront an abstract evil but also to undertake practi-
cal measures in response to the suffering of others: 
“So speak the voices from the land of the dead to 
you, the voices of the Jewish children and women 
and old people murdered by the Nazis under your 
noses. And when you ask where this voice of the 
dead is speaking to you, you yourselves know the 
answer: it is the voice of your own conscience…You 
can no longer silence this voice within yourselves.”65 
This convergence of essence (the inner voice) and 
existence (the voices of the suffering) underlies the 
reasons why conscience is both “the most subjective 
self-interpretation of personal life”66 and a trans-
moral judgment “according to the participation in a 
reality which transcends the sphere of moral com-
mands.”67 Levinas worries about “our indifference of 
‘good conscience’ for what is far and what is near;”68 
Tillich similarly disabuses this indifference with re-
spect to the demands of essence (an absolute impera-
tive) and existence (the particular circumstances of 
the situation).  
Does this analysis of conscience mitigate the 
claims that Tillich’s ethics constitutes an overly in-
dividualistic ethic (and thus reinforces Levinas’s 
critiques of totality)? Eberhard Amelung points to 
individualistic tendencies in Tillich’s thought: “Til-
lich has done more than most German philosophers 
and theologians in order to overcome the individual-
istic approach of German idealism. And yet, perhaps 
due to the influence of C.G. Jung and psychother-
apy, the self remains the center of the system. As 
Tillich grew older this tendency became stronger. In 
the course of this development his ethic also re-
mained strongly individualistic.”69 Thomas Ogletree, 
in Hospitality to the Stranger that engages Levinas 
and Ricoeur out of a framework of Christian ethics, 
deems compelling Tillich’s appeal to a self-
transcending moral imperative, but Ogletree too dis-
covers shortcomings in Tillich’s system with respect 
to encounters between others: “Consequently, we 
still do not find in Tillich’s work an account of the 
actual manifestation of the material meaning of the 
moral imperative in the concrete encounter between 
persons. What is even more disappointing is that 
Tillich, while seeming to give central place to the I-
thou encounter in the constitution of moral experi-
ence, continually subordinates that encounter to the 
dynamics of self-integration.”70 Ogletree concludes 
that a solution lies somewhere between a Tillichian 
self-integration and a Levinasian call of the other. 
Though Amelung and Ogletree are correct in press-
ing Tillich on this crucial issue of self and other, I 
argue that both thinkers do not fully appreciate the 
aspects of relationality and community (undertaken 
comprehensively in the third volume of the System-
atic Theology) that underlie and sustain questions of 
self, otherness, love, and justice and to which we 
now turn to as a conclusion. 
 
Tillich’s Insights: Symbols and Love as Reunion 
The dialogue between Tillich and the postmod-
ern thinkers has revealed both the limits and insights 
of Tillich’s ontology. One insight that has been dis-
cussed pertains to the dynamic between transcen-
dence and participation, where the self is tran-
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scended in its encounter with disparate forms of oth-
erness, yet the self is irreducibly preserved in that it 
remains embedded in the essential structures of real-
ity. Symbols constitute one dimension where tran-
scendence and participation co-exist in a fruitful ten-
sion; symbols open the self to new levels of tran-
scendence, but they affirm the presence of meaning 
even as they nullify and disintegrate this meaning.71 
Love as the reunion of the separated functions 
similarly along the transcendence/ participation dia-
lectic. As Tillich writes: “Love is the drive toward 
the reunion of the separated; this is ontologically and 
therefore universally true.”72 This drive toward reun-
ion, exemplified in agape but funded by the desire 
of eros, entails “participation in the other one 
through participation in the transcendent unity of 
unambiguous life,”73 and it is manifested as “partici-
pating knowledge which changes both the knower 
and the known in the very act of loving knowl-
edge.”74 This “loving knowledge,” even if fragmen-
tary within the Spiritual Presence, mediates between 
absolutism and relativism and enables Tillich to re-
spond to postmodern critics of ontology. Love as 
reunion affirms, yet transforms self and other, in-
tersubjectivity, and justice, in ways that Bataille, 
Kristeva, and Levinas75 appear to abdicate in their 
attention to otherness. As recent works in Tillichian 
scholarship76 demonstrate, engagement between Til-
lich and postmodernity should continue to yield con-
structive conversations.  
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1 A Theology of Compassion, XVII. 
2 Davies explains the ways Bakhtinian dialogism and 
pragmatics pertain to an enhanced being: “Within such a 
dialogical view of the self, the encounter with the other as 
interlocutor becomes central to our own self-possession as 
speaking and reflexive creatures, and becomes, as we 
have argued, the epiphany of being, as the existential re-
alization of our own dialectical self-transcendence” (Ibid.,  
159). To reify such connections between narrativity and 
being, Davies appeal to the stories of Holocaust victims 
Etty Hillesum and Edith Stein and an unnamed victim of 
ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. 
3 Davies implicates modern figures in his indictment 
of ontology: “We need not progress along the Leibnizean 
and Heideggerian path of asking what is the meaning of 
being as such, which would inevitably be to replace our 
preferred paradigm, which is concerned specifically with 
the self in relation to the other, with the model we have 
called ‘Being and Oneness,’ which focuses upon the me-
dium of being itself, to the relative exclusion of the con-
crete being” (Ibid.,  52).     
4 Ibid.,  53. 
5 Ibid.,  73. Davies explains: “Compassion is the rec-
ognition of the otherness of the other, as an otherness 
which stands beyond our own world, beyond our own 
Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society Volume 30, number 3 Summer 2004 
 
38 
                                                                            
constructions of otherness even. But it is also the discov-
ery of our own nature, as a horizon of subjectivity that is 
foundationally ordered to the world of another experience, 
in what Paul Ricoeur has called ‘the paradox of the ex-
change at the very place of the irreplaceable.’ It is here 
then, in the dispossessive act whereby the self assumes 
the burdens of the other, and thus accepts the surplus of 
its own identity, that we should recognize the veiled pres-
ence of being” ( 17). 
6 Ibid.,  33. 
7 Ibid.,  35. 
8 Ibid.,  220. 
9 Ibid.,  158. 
10 Ibid.,  43. Davies does commend Rahner’s ontol-
ogy for its anti-reductionistic character, yet he asserts that 
Rahner ontology continues to disqualify notions of the 
self as ineluctably mediated by otherness: “But [Rahner’s 
ontology] is still in a Kantian-Heideggerian world, gov-
erned by the cognitive faculties of the self, rather than a 
world that comes to existence only as the self is given 
over, without remainder, into the alien power of the 
other” (Ibid., 158). 
11 For Tillich and Davies, there is a dialectic relation-
ship between ontology and existence that disavows total 
essentialism. Moreover, both thinkers envision the en-
counter between self and other in self-reflexive terms. 
Davies describes this impact on the self as transfiguration, 
or the appropriate word for transcendence that “retains the 
irreducible mutuality of self and other, albeit as unity in 
opposition” (Ibid., 43). Tillich speaks of the self-reflexive 
impact on the self as insight, conversion, or reunion (al-
beit ambiguously experienced) of the self with self, other, 
and world. 
12 A History of Christian Thought, 438. Tillich offers 
a similar assessment in Theology of Culture, 92, original 
emphasis, when he asserts that “Schelling follows Hegel 
in emphasizing the ‘subject’ and its freedom against Sub-
stance and its necessity. But while in Hegel the ‘subject’ 
is immediately identified with the thinking subject, in 
Schelling it becomes rather the ‘existing’ or immediately 
experiencing subject.” In his own writing, Schelling iden-
tifies Hegel’s method as one demanding that “[philoso-
phy] should withdraw into pure thinking, and that it 
should have as sole immediate object the pure concept” 
(On the History of Modern Philosophy,  134).  
13 In Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness in 
Schelling’s Philosophical Development, 31, Tillich de-
scribes this contradiction: “Guilt-consciousness is the 
religious expression for the absolute contradiction be-
tween God and man.” Emil Fackenheim, “Schelling’s 
                                                                            
Conception of Positive Philosophy,” The Review of Meta-
physics VII (1954), 565. Fackenheim clarifies Schelling’s 
characterization of negative philosophy: “Negative phi-
losophy is not metaphysics, but the search for the meta-
physical principle” ( 579). He concludes ( 582) that 
Schelling’s fusion of negative and positive philosophy—
while historically undervalued—ultimately fails. For fur-
ther study of Schelling’s philosophy and its reception, 
please see Dale Snow, Schelling and the End of Idealism, 
Robert Brown, The Later Philosophy of Schelling, Robert 
Scharlemann, “Tillich and Schelling on the Principle of 
Identity,” The Journal of Religion 56 (1976): 105-112, 
and Thomas O’Meara, “F.W.J. Schelling,” The Review of 
Metaphysics XXI (1977): 283-309. 
14 Ages of the World, 73. Schelling’s contentious 
claim of the Yes and No of God is further intensified by 
the order envisaged by Schelling: “The negating, contract-
ing will must precede into revelation so that there is 
something that shores up and carries upward the grace of 
the divine being, without which grace would not be capa-
ble of revealing itself. There must be Might before there 
is Leniency and Stringency before Gentleness. There is 
first Wrath, then Love. Only with Love does the wrathful 
actually become God” (83). Robert Brown, in The Later 
Philosophy of Schelling, 269, comments that here 
Schelling moves beyond Böhme: whereas Böhme ac-
counts for the dialectical character of God’s freedom, 
“Ages moves only in the opposite direction. God begins as 
a duality, and attains his unity only as an achievement, a 
voluntary duality-in-unity.”   
15 Tillich renders potency as “[t]he real, dark princi-
ple of the philosophy of nature [that] is nothing other than 
the actualization of this contradiction. Freedom is the 
power to become disunited from oneself. Consistent with 
the meaning of the word, Schelling now calls this power 
potency” (The Construction of the History of Religion in 
Schelling’s Positive Philosophy: Its Presuppositions and 
Principles,  48). Schelling makes the same point in The 
Ages of the World, Section 226,  17: “A being cannot ne-
gate itself as actual without at the same time positing one-
self as the actualizing potency that begets itself.” 
16 Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness in Schelling’s 
Philosophical Development,  99 original emphasis. In The 
Courage to Be,  180, Tillich further elaborates on the im-
portance of the Yes-No dialectic for the living God: 
“Nonbeing makes God a living God. Without the No he 
has to overcome in himself and in his creatures, the divine 
Yes to himself would be lifeless. There would be no reve-
lation of the ground of being, there would be no life.”  
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17 In Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 421, Tillich 
elaborates on this point with respect to the Trinity: “There 
is no blessedness where there is no conquest of the oppo-
site possibility, and there is no life where there is no ‘oth-
erness.’ The trinitarian symbol of the Logos as the princi-
ple of divine self-manifestation in creation and salvation 
introduces the element of otherness into the Divine Life 
without which it would not be life.” 
18 For elaboration on these differences, please see 
Jerome Stone’s “Tillich and Schelling’s Later Philoso-
phy,” in Kairos and Logos: Studies in the Roots and Im-
plications of Tillich’s Theology, edited by John Carey, 3-
35. Stone’s list includes some straightforward distinctions 
(e.g., Schelling was not a theologian), but it also notes an 
important “shift between Schelling and Tillich from the 
language of speculating to the language of symbol” (35). 
Additionally, Ian Thompson, in his Being and Meaning, 
89, writes: “Schelling tends to subordinate theology to the 
philosophy of art, whereas in Tillich’s case art is put to 
use in the service of theology.” 
19 Each of these writers themselves experienced these 
phenomena in varying degrees. Bataille battled a pulmo-
nary disease throughout his life to the point where it be-
came debilitating; Kristeva emigrated from Bulgaria to 
France; and Levinas endured a double tragedy: his family 
died in the Holocaust, and as a French soldier, he became 
a prisoner of war in Germany.  
20 Inner Experience, 11. 
21 Ibid., 43. 
22 Ibid., 59. 
23 Though Bataille concentrates his critiques on 
Hegel, Amy Hollywood describes the extent to which 
Bataille’s disdain toward project also distinguishes his 
views from Sartre’s: “Sartre’s and Bataille’s opposing 
attitudes toward human projects are crucial here. Sartre 
insists that to be human is to engage in projects; Bataille 
argues that inner experience is the opposite of project; 
thus he generates endlessly recursive negations of his own 
attempt to provide a method for attaining inner experi-
ence” (Sensible Ecstasy, 30). Indeed, there is a certain 
paradox within Bataille’s writing in that he seeks to refute 
system by constructing his own system of atheology or of 
the unfinished system of nonknowledge. 
24 Inner Experience, 12. 
25 The Unfinished System of Nonknowledge, 203. 
26 Inner Experience, 52.  
27 Ibid., 113. 
28 The Unfinished System of Nonknowledge, 21. 
Bataille reiterates that “[t]he impossible is the loss of the 
self” (Ibid.,  24). 
                                                                            
29 Amy Hollywood castigates Bataille’s use of the 
tortured victim on ethical and ideological grounds: 
“Bataille’s practice is problematic in that he seems to use 
another human being’s unchosen suffering as a means 
toward his own ecstatic anguish. Even if we read that ec-
static anguish as itself an ethical response to the meaning-
lessness of the other’s radically contingent torment, prob-
lems remain, for it is not clear that who suffers is in fact 
so radically contingent. Rather, differences in race, class, 
gender, sexuality, and ethnicity make it more likely that 
members of one or another particular group will be the 
subject of physical torture and thus serve as the noncon-
tingent means through which the contingency of human 
bodily experience finds experience” (Sensible Ecstasy, 
95). 
30 Inner Experience, 120. 
31 Ibid., 104. 
32 Among a myriad examples, Bataille contends that 
“the will to salvation signifies the resolution to escape the 
impossible” (The Unfinished System of Nonknowledge, 
21). Bataille does acknowledge affinities between ecstasy 
and mystical theology or negative theology, but he avers 
that ecstasy equates to atheology that is “totally negative” 
(Ibid., 146). Contemplation of the cross can be efficacious 
to the extent that one substitutes oneself for Christ: “Es-
sentially, we must reflect on the crucifixion and place 
ourselves in the situation of personal assumption, aban-
doning respect in the name of transgression” (Ibid., 236). 
33 Systematic Theology, Volume 1, 113. 
34 In terms of the Scriptural sources, Tillich locates 
the presence of ecstasy in the writings of Paul: “The unity 
of ecstasy and structure is classically expressed in Paul’s 
doctrine of the Spirit. Paul is primarily the theologian of 
the Spirit” (Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 116). Paul 
further envisages the fusion of ecstasy and structure 
through Spirit in his letter to the Corinthians: “In the 
hymn to agape in I Corinthians, chapter 13, the structure 
of the moral imperative and the ecstasy of the Spiritual 
Presence are completely united. Similarly, the first three 
chapters of the same letter indicate a way to unite the 
structure of cognition with the ecstasy of the Spiritual 
Presence” (Ibid., 117). Tillich additionally points to the 
Gospels as illustrative of ecstasy: “Ecstatic experiences 
appear again and again in the Gospel stories. They show 
the Spiritual Presence driving Jesus into the desert, lead-
ing him through the visionary experiences of temptation, 
giving him the power of divination with respect to people 
and events, and making him the conqueror of demonic 
powers and the Spiritual healer of mind and body” (Ibid., 
144). In terms of the philosophical sources, Plato but es-
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pecially Neo-Platonists such as Plotinus uphold the 
unique place of ecstasy. Tillich identifies the Middle Pla-
tonist Philo as one of the earliest figures who “developed 
a doctrine of ecstasy, or ek-stasis, which means ‘standing 
outside oneself.’ This is the highest form of piety which 
lies beyond faith” (A History of Christian Thought, 13). 
This philosophical conception of ecstasy has subsequently 
impacted Christian theologians and mystics, including 
Origen, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Bonaventure. 
35 Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 112; Ibid.,  112. 
Ecstasy therefore helps further clarify the experience of 
God as being-itself or the ground of being enables one to 
speak rationally and ecstatically at the same time. This 
speaking about God refers back to the self and its ordi-
nary/ ecstatic experience of holiness: “The term ‘ecstatic’ 
in the phrase ‘ecstatic idea of God’ points to the experi-
ence of the holy as transcending ordinary experience 
without removing it. Ecstasy as a state of mind is the ex-
act correlate to self-transcendence as the state of reality. 
Such an understanding of the idea of God is neither natu-
ralistic nor supranaturalistic. It underlies the whole of the 
present theological system” (Systematic Theology, Vol-
ume 2, 8). 
36 Ibid., 112. 
37 Tillich describes prophetic witness (“Prophets 
speak in terms which express the ‘depth of reason’ and its 
ecstatic experience” Systematic Theology, Volume 1, 
143), agapic love (“As the ecstatic participation in the 
transcendent unity of unambiguous life, agape is experi-
enced as blessedness” (Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 
136), and prayer (“A union of subject and object has 
taken place in which the independent existence of each is 
overcome; new unity is created. The best and most uni-
versal example of an ecstatic experience is the pattern of 
prayer.” Ibid.,  119). 
38 Powers of Horror, in The Portable Kristeva: Up-
dated Edition, 230. 
39 Ibid., 235 (original emphasis) 
40 Tales of Love, 248-249. Kristeva further elaborates 
on this heterogeneity: “We lives on that border, cross-
roads beings, crucified beings. A woman is neither no-
madic nor a male body that considers itself earthly only in 
erotic passion. A mother is a continuous separation, a 
division of the very flesh. And consequently a division of 
language—and it has always been so.” (Ibid., 254). 
41 Levinas describes the pure passivity demanded by 
the maternal body: “The-one-for-another has the form of 
sensibility or vulnerability, pure passivity or susceptibil-
ity, passive to the point of becoming an inspiration, that 
is, alterity in the same, the trope of the body animated by 
                                                                            
the soul, psyche in the form of a hand that gives even the 
bread taken from its own mouth. Here the psyche in the 
maternal body” (Otherwise than Being, 67). 
42 Ibid.,  374. 
43 Dynamics of Faith, 106. In Gilkey on Tillich, 29, 
Langdon Gilkey indicates that Tillich subsumes the fusion 
of these dimensions in and through self-awareness: “In us, 
being is ‘present to itself,’ aware of itself, its body, its 
environment, its space and time, its future. Here the inor-
ganic, the organic, the psychic, and what even transcends 
these, are wedded together in our awareness of our own 
being.” 
44 In “Being and Word in Tillich’s Doctrine of Spiri-
tual Presence: Issues of Subjectivity and Relationality,” in 
Being versus Word in Paul Tillich’s Theology?, edited by 
Gert Hummel and Doris Lax, Stenger probes Tillich’s 
interconnection of being and Word that funds his rela-
tional ontology through the Spiritual Presence. Though 
she concedes his appreciation of the body could be more 
extensive, Stenger holds that his relational ontology 
“resonates well with several feminist approaches [e.g., 
Sheila Davaney, Catherine Keller, Thandeka, Linell 
Cady] [because] it affirms the self, including the body, 
draws humans outwardly toward each other, and directs 
them toward that which is ultimate in a response of devo-
tion and commitment” (296). 
45 Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 294. 
46 “Dimensions, Levels, and the Unity of Life,” in 
Main Works, Volume 6: Theological Writings, edited by 
Gert Hummel, 404. 
47 Tillich’s capacious conception of the person ex-
tends to displaced persons such as refugees; his vigilance 
against reducing them to things comports with Kristeva’s 
perspective. In Strangers to Ourselves in The Portable 
Kristeva: Updated Edition, 265, Kristeva writes: “Let us 
not seek to solidify, to turn the otherness of the foreigner 
into a thing. Let us merely touch it, brush by it, without 
giving a permanent structure.” Similarly, in “The Theol-
ogy of Pastoral Care: The Spiritual and Theological 
Foundations of Pastoral Care,” The Meaning of Health, 
125, Tillich discusses the dehumanizing treatment of 
refugees as objects: “It was one of my early experiences 
in this country to come to the sharp realization that the 
refugees, who felt themselves to be persons, became ob-
jects and nothing more than objects when they were trans-
formed into cases to be dealt with twenty minutes by the 
social worker. It often broke their self-awareness as a 
person. This example shows that the problem of becom-
ing an object applies to all forms of taking care of some-
one, be it the social, the educational, the political, the 
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medical, or the psycho-therapeutic function. In all of them 
the heart of the subject-object problem is of decisive im-
portance.” 
48 Totality and Infinity, 43. Levinas contends that the 
Western tradition “guarantees knowledge its congenital 
synthesizing and its self-sufficiency, foreshadowing the 
systematic unity of consciousness, and the integration of 
all that is other into the system and the present” (“Phi-
losophy and Transcendence” in Alterity and Transcen-
dence, 12). Levinas’s censure of ontology and system is 
not limited to the epistemological level; a fortiori Levinas 
claims that the totality of ontology and system underlies 
the totalitarianism of the state (e.g., Nazism): “Ontology 
as first philosophy is a philosophy of power” (Totality 
and Infinity,  46). Tillich contends that power underpins 
love and justice, but love and justice impose constraints 
on power. 
49 Levinas, in “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas” 
(with Richard Kearney) in Face to Face with Levinas, 
edited by Richard Cohen, 20, contends that “Dasein is its 
history to the extent that it can interpret and narrate its 
existence as a finite and contemporaneous story, a totaliz-
ing experience of past, present, and future.”  
50 Otherwise Than Being, 183. The face, in fact, “is 
the very collapse of phenomenality” (Ibid., 88). 
51 Ibid.,  42. 
52 Ibid., 46. 
53 Ibid., 49. 
54 Ibid., 119. 
55 Ibid., 122. In Ibid., 156, Levinas develops the same 
point: “The Infinite does not enter into a theme like a be-
ing to be given in it, and thus belie its beyond being.” 
56 Ibid., 14. 
57 In the Time of Many Nations, translated by Michael 
Smith, 111. 
58 Otherwise Than Being, 10. 
59 “The Proximity of the Other,” in Alterity and Tran-
scendence, 98. In consonance with Kristeva’s analysis of 
maternity, Levinas asserts that otherness precedes one’s 
own body: “The sensible—maternity, vulnerability, ap-
prehension—binds the node of incarnation into a plot 
larger than the apperception of self. In this plot I am 
bound to others before being tied to my body” (Otherwise 
Than Being, 76).  
60 Otherwise than Being, 182 (my emphasis). In the 
same text, Levinas describes the same phenomenon where 
“one discloses oneself by neglecting one’s defenses, leav-
ing a shelter, exposing oneself to outrage, to insults and 
wounding” (Ibid.,  49). The image of “leaving a shelter” 
further differentiates Levinas’s account from Tillich’s 
                                                                            
notions of love, reunion of the separated, and morality, 
constitution of the person as person in the encounter with 
other persons. In “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas” 
(with Richard Kearney) in Face to Face with Levinas, 
edited by Richard Cohen, 22, Levinas distinguishes his 
preferred notion of sociality from the reductive concept of 
unity: “Man’s relationship with the other is better as dif-
ference than as unity: sociality is better than fusion. The 
very value of love is the impossibility of reducing the 
other to myself.”  
61 “Philosophy and Transcendence,” in Alterity and 
Transcendence, 5. “God” as the Infinite Other receives 
significant treatment in Levinas’s writings, particularly 
his reflections on the Talmud. Levinas conceptualizes 
religion in terms of moral experience (“Religious experi-
ence, at least for the Talmud, can only be primarily a 
moral experience,” “Toward the Other,” in Nine Talmudic 
Readings, translated and with an introduction by Annette 
Aronowicz), where, for example, “[t]he image of God is 
better honored in the right given to the stranger than in 
symbols” (Ibid.,  28). When comparing these conceptions 
to Tillich’s, we can thus note similarities (Tillich also 
unites morality and religion) as well as differences (Til-
lich prefers the language of symbols, not obligations to 
the others, as that which expresses the imago Dei. One 
should not overstate these similarities or differences. For 
example, I argue that there is significant resonance be-
tween Tillich’s symbol of the “God beyond God” and 
Levinas’s symbol of the transcendent face: “it is as if the 
face of the other person, which straightaway ‘demands of 
me’ and ordains me, were the mode of the very intrigue of 
God’s surpassing the idea of God, and of every idea 
where He would be aimed at, visible, and known, and 
where the Infinite would be denied through thematization, 
in presence or representation” (“The Old and the New,” in 
Time and the Other (and Additional Essays), translated by 
Richard Cohen, 136-137, my emphasis). For an extended 
comparison between notions of God in Levinas and Chris-
tian theology, specifically Barth’s theology, please see 
Steven Smith, The Argument to the Other: Reason Be-
yond Reason in the Thought of Karl Barth and Emmanuel 
Levinas.  
62 Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Ed-
ward Robinson, as quoted by Frank Schalow in “The Ty-
pography of Heidegger’s Concept of Conscience,” Ameri-
can Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Volume LXIX 
(1995), 260.  
63 For Tillich’s presentation of the ‘silent voice,’ see 
Morality and Beyond, 24, 34 (“the silent voice of man’s 
own essential nature”), and 80 (‘mode of silence’).   
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64 Theology of Culture, 138-139. By contrast, Levinas 
submits that conscience “welcomes the Other” and “calls 
in question the naïve rights of my powers, my glorious 
spontaneity as a living being” (Totality and Infinity, 84).  
65 Against the Third Reich, 213.  
66 Morality and Beyond, 65. 
67 Ibid., 77. Thus, like Levinas where “transcendence 
is compressed into the sphere of intersubjective exis-
tence” (Edith Wyschogrod, “God and ‘Being’s Move’ in 
the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas,” The Journal of 
Religion 62 (1982), 146), Tillich affirms transcendence as 
encounter (e.g., the moment of kairos experienced as 
revelation) that supersedes the self. Yet, unlike Levinas, 
Tillich reinscribes this transcendence as constitutive of 
the formation of the moral and cultural dimensions of the 
self: “Religion, or the self-transcendence of life under the 
dimension of spirit, is essentially related to morality and 
culture. There is no self-transcendence under the dimen-
sion of the spirit without the constitution of the moral self 
by the unconditional imperative, and this self-
transcendence cannot take form except within the uni-
verse of meaning created in the cultural act” (Systematic 
Theology, Volume 3, 95). 
68 In the Time of Many Nations, translated by Michael 
Smith, 110. 
69 “Life and Selfhood in Tillich’s Theology,” in Kai-
ros and Logos: Studies in the Roots and Implications of 
Tillich’s Theology, edited by John Carey, 182. 
70 Hospitality of the Stranger, 41. 
71 See, inter alia, “Das Religiöse Symbol,” in Main 
Works, Volume 4: Writings in the Philosophy of Religion, 
edited by John Clayton, 213-228. There Tillich develops 
further distinctions, including the two levels of religious 
symbols, the first level of “religiösen Gegenstandssym-
bole” (objective religious symbols) and the second level 
of “religiösen Hinweissymbole” (self-transcending relig-
ious symbols) (Ibid., 221-224 original emphasis). In his 
Dynamics of Faith, 41-43, Tillich adumbrates six features 
of a symbol: it points beyond itself; it participates in that 
to which it points; it opens us levels of reality which oth-
erwise are closed to us; it unlocks dimensions and ele-
ments of our soul which correspond to the dimensions and 
elements of reality; it cannot be produced intentionally; 
and it cannot be invented. In his 1961 “The Meaning and 
Justification of Religious Symbols,” Main Works, Volume 
4: Writings in the Philosophy of Religion, edited by John 
Clayton, 415-420, Tillich identifies slightly different 
characteristics of a symbol: it points beyond itself; it par-
ticipates in the reality of that which it represents; it cannot 
be created at will; it has power to open up dimensions of 
                                                                            
reality, in correlation to dimensions of the human spirit; 
and it possesses an integrating and disintegrating power. 
The negation of symbols, of course, derives from Tillich’s 
Protestant principle that repudiates any notion of absolut-
ism within symbols. 
72 Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 134. Put differ-
ently, “[l]ove as the reunion of those who are separate 
does not distort or destroy in its union” (Systematic The-
ology, Volume 1,  282). 
73 Ibid., 134. 
74 Ibid., 137. 
75 The issue of justice, or the appearance of the third, 
poses challenges for Levinas. He affirms the centrality of 
justice, but he does fully resolve tensions between the 
relationship of self and other as hostage and lord and the 
order and thematization of justice: “The third party intro-
duces a contradiction in the saying whose signification 
before the other until then went in one direction. It is of 
itself the limit of responsibility and the birth of the ques-
tion: What do I have to do with justice? A question of 
consciousness. Justice is necessary, that is, comparison, 
coexistence, contemporaneousness, assembling, order, 
thematization, the visibility of faces, and thus intentional-
ity and the intellect, the intelligibility of a system, and 
thence also a co-presence on an equal footing as before a 
court of justice (Otherwise than Being, 157).  
Theodore de Boer, in “An Ethical Transcendental 
Philosophy,” in Face to Face with Levinas, edited by 
Richard Cohen, argues that the presence of the third prob-
lematizes Levinas’s notions of unlimited responsibility: 
“The entrance onto the scene of the third man makes a 
comparison and weighing of responsibility necessary—
and thereby also a thematizing and theorizing. This im-
plies a certain correction, as Levinas puts it leniently, of 
the infinite demands that the other imposes upon me” 
(102, original emphasis). 
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